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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(j). This case was poured-over by the Utah Supreme Court. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 37. Failure to Make or Cooperate in Discovery; Sanctions 
(f) Failure to disclose. If a party fails to disclose a witness, document 
or other material as required by Rule 26(a) or Rule 26(e)(1), or to 
amend a prior response to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), that 
party shall not be permitted to use the witness, document or other 
material at any hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the 
party shows good cause for the failure to disclose. In addition to or in 
lieu of this sanction, the court on motion may take any action 
authorized by Subdivision (b)(2). 
URCP 37(f) (2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Defendants/Appellees, Owen Salkin and Coldwell Banker Residential Broker-
age (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Coldwell Banker") are not satisfied with 
the statement of the issue included in the Appellant's Brief. (App. Br., p. 1). The 
issue presented for review is: 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied Plaintiffs Third Motion 
to Amend Scheduling Order to Allow More Time for Disclosure of Experts 
(hereinafter "Third Motion to Amend Scheduling Order")? 
Plaintiff/Appellant, Chris Lippman (hereinafter "Lippman"), distorts the 
simplicity of the issue presented on appeal by arguing in his statement of the issue that 
the denial "is tantamount to a dismissal given the necessary nature of the experts to 
prove the Appellant's case." (App. Br., p. 1). The trial court's denial of the Third 
Motion to Amend Scheduling Order is not equal to dismissal. 
STATEMENT OF CASE/STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Lippman filed his Complaint in this case on May 30, 2006. (R. 0001). 
2. Lippman amended his Complaint on March 7, 2007. (R. 0334). 
3. On or about March 19, 2007, the trial court entered a Rule 26(f) 
Scheduling Order. (R. 0450). 
4. On or about October 19,2007, the trial court entered an Amended Rule 
26(f) Scheduling Order. The Amended Rule 26(f) Scheduling Order allowed the 
parties additional time to conduct discovery. (R. 0614). 
5. On or about February 6,2008, the trial court entered a Second Amended 
Rule 26(f) Scheduling Order (hereinafter the "Second Amended Scheduling Order"). 
(R. 1099). 
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6. The Second Amended Scheduling Order again provided the parties with 
additional time to conduct discovery. Pursuant to the Second Amended Scheduling 
Order, the deadline for Lippman's expert designations and reports was April 1,2008. 
(R. 1099). 
7. On or about March 26, 2008, Lippman filed a Second Amended 
Complaint. In the Second Amended Complaint, Lippman made no changes to his 
claims against Coldwell Banker. (R. 1768). 
8. On or about April 3, 2008, Lippman filed a Motion to Amend 
Scheduling Order to Allow More Time for Disclosure of Experts (hereinafter the 
"First Motion to Amend Scheduling Order"). (R. 1892). 
9. Although dated April 1, 2008, Lippman's Motion was actually filed 
with the trial court two days after the expiration of the expert deadline contained in 
the Second Amended Scheduling Order. (Id.). 
10. In his First Motion to Amend Scheduling Order, Lippman requested that 
the trial court once again allow him more time to locate and disclose his experts and 
reports. Lippman sought to extend his expert discovery deadline an additional sixty 
days, or until May 31, 2008. (R. 1892). 
11. In his appellate brief, Lippman refers to this Motion as his "first 
motion," however it was in actuality his third request to amend and extend the 
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deadlines contained in the original Rule 26(f) Scheduling Order. (Appellant's Brief, 
p. 22; R. 1892). 
12. While Coldwell Banker had no desire to further delay this case, it did 
not object 1o Lippman's First Motion to Amend Scheduling Order as Lippman only 
requested an additional sixty days based upon what was represented to be extenuating 
circumstances. (R. 2332). 
13. Coldwell Banker disclosed its experts and their reports on April 30, 
2008, in compliance with the Second Amended Scheduling Order. (R. pp. 2137-
2144) 
14. On March 2,2009, almost an entire year after it was filed and more than 
nine months after the expiration of what would have been the expert discovery 
deadline he requested, Lippman belatedly requested that the trial court issue a 
decision on his First Motion to Amend Scheduling Order decision (hereinafter the 
"Request to Submit"). (R. 2295). 
15. Contemporaneous with the filing of his Request to Submit, Lippman 
also submitted a proposed Order on his First Motion to Amend Scheduling Order to 
Allow More Time for Disclosure of Experts (hereinafter the "Proposed Order on First 
Motion to Amend Scheduling Order"). (R. 2292). 
16. In the Proposed Order on First Motion to Amend Scheduling Order, 
Lippman misled the trial Court by representing that Lippman's First Motion to Amend 
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Scheduling Order had requested an extension of the expert discovery deadline until 
March 15, 2009, when in fact, the First Motion to Amend Scheduling Order 
undisputedly requested an extension only until May 31, 2008. (R. 2292 and 1892). 
17. On March 2, 2009, Lippman also filed a Certificate of Service of 
Plaintiffs Disclosure of Expert Witnesses and Reports. This filing marked the first 
time in the three-year pendency of this litigation that Lippman had attempted to 
disclose or designate any expert witnesses in this case or take any action in pursuit of 
his claims against Coldwell Banker. (R. 2322). 
18. On or about March 9,2009, Coldwell Banker formally objected to both 
the tardy Request to Submit for Decision and the deceptive Proposed Order Seeking 
to Amend Scheduling Order to Allow More Time for Disclosure of Experts. (R. 
2331). 
19. On or about March 13,2009, Lippman filed a Second Motion to Amend 
Scheduling Order to Allow More Time for Disclosure of Experts. (R. 2348). In 
reality, this was actually Lippman's fourth attempt to amend the original Rule 26(f) 
Scheduling Order. (R. 2348). 
20. On or about March 16, 2009, the trial court denied Lippman's First 
Motion to Amend Scheduling Order noting that "[t]he Motion is stale and, given the 
age of this case, it would be inappropriate to allow further amendments." (R. 2369). 
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21. On or about March 24,2009, Lippman filed "Plaintiffs Withdrawal of 
Second Motion to Amend Scheduling Order to Allow More Time for Disclosure of 
Experts". (R. 2374). 
22. On that same date, Lippman also filed "Plaintiffs Third Motion to 
Amend Scheduling Order to Allow More Time for Disclosure of Experts" (hereinafter 
"Third Motion to Amend Scheduling Order"). (R. 2377). 
23. Given that all of the discovery deadlines set forth in the Second 
Amended Scheduling Order had long since expired, that Coldwell Banker had long 
been prepared to proceed to trial, and that Lippman had only recently demonstrated 
a renewed interest in trying his claims against Coldwell Banker, on March 31, 2009, 
Coldwell Banker certified the case ready for trial and requested a pre-trial conference. 
(R.2412). 
24. On or about June 2,2009, the trial court conducted a telephonic pre-trial 
conference wherein the foregoing issues were discussed, and the court set this matter 
for trial from October 7-9,2009. The trial court also committed to rule expeditiously 
on Lippman's Third Motion to Amend Scheduling Order. (R. 2438). 
25. By a Decision dated June 10, 2009, the trial court denied Lippman's 
Third Motion to Amend Scheduling Order (hereinafter "Order"). (R. 2441. A true 
and accurate copy of said Order is included in the addendum of Appellant's Brief). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Coldwell Banker's argument on appeal is straightforward. Lippman filed his 
expert disclosures and reports nearly a year after the expert discovery deadline. The 
belated reports and disclosures were required to be excluded by the trial court 
pursuant to operation of Utah R. Civ. P. 37. Lippman had the opportunity to 
demonstrate good cause to excuse the tardiness of his expert disclosures, however the 
trial court held that there was no good cause to excuse the tardiness and prejudice that 
would result if Lippman were allowed to present the expert witnesses and their 
reports. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Lippman's Third 
Motion to Amend Scheduling Order. 
ARGUMENT 
I. LIPPMAN'S EXPERT WITNESSES WERE EXCLUDED BY 
OPERATION OF RULE; NOT AS THE RESULT OF A SANCTION OR 
DISMISSAL IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
The subject of this appeal is the trial court's denial of Lippman's Third Motion 
to Amend Scheduling Order. (R. 2441). Lippman argues that this Court should treat 
the lower court's denial as both a discovery sanction and a "de facto" dismissal of his 
claims against Coldwell Banker. (App. Br., pp. 1, 23). However, the Order denying 
Lippman's Third Motion to Amend is neither a sanction nor a dismissal of Lippman's 
claims. While the trial court detailed a variety of reasons supporting its denial of 
Lippman's Third Motion to Amend Scheduling Order, the court made no reference 
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to its action being a sanction or having dismissed Lippman's claims against Coldwell 
Banker. (R. 2441). 
The Utah Court of Appeals recognizes that a trial court "has great latitude in 
determining the most efficient and fair manner to conduct the court's business . . ." 
Normandeau v. Hanson Equipment, Inc., 174 P.3d 1, 7 (Utah App. 2007). Rule 37(f) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that: 
If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material . . . 
that party shall not be permitted to use the witness, document or other 
material at any hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the 
party shows good cause for the failure to disclose. 
URCP 37(f) (2009) (Emphasis added). A trial court's enforcement of its scheduling 
order and the rules which govern the same is not tantamount to the imposition of a 
sanction. .See Aspenwood, L.L.C. v. C.A.T., L.L.C., 73 P.3d 947, 951 (Utah App. 
2003) (internal citation omitted)1. 
A. Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f) Required the Trial Court to Exclude 
Lippman's Tardy Expert Reports; Exclusion Was Not a Sanction. 
This Court recently addressed a nearly identical issue in Posner v. Equity Title 
Ins. Agency, Inc., 2009 UT App 347. In Posner, the trial court struck Posner's 
In Aspenwood, the trial court's order regarding discovery did not amount to a 
sanction where party claimed that, due to the court's order, it ran out of time to 
complete the depositions of several individuals, and therefore, was not able to 
conduct full and fair discovery. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court 
holding that it was within the trial court's discretion to impose a deposition 
schedule, that the aggrieved party was granted previous extensions and did not 
object to the discovery schedule. Id. 
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designation of his expert because it was untimely. Id., ^  6. Thereafter, the trial court 
granted summary judgment in favor of defendant based on the absence of expert 
testimony. IdL, f^ 7. Posner appealed the lower court's exclusion of his expert report 
and its grant of summary judgment. In affirming the lower court's exclusion of 
Posner's expert, the Court of Appeals made clear that "[t]he trial court did not dismiss 
Posner's action as a sanction; rather it excluded his expert's testimony because 
disclosure of the witness's identity and report was untimely." Id., ^ j 23, f.8. Referring 
to Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f), the Court went on to explain that "Utah law mandates that 
a trial court exclude an expert witness report disclosed after expiration of the 
established deadline unless the trial court otherwise chooses to exercise its equitable 
discretion." Posner v. Equity Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 2009 UT App 347, f 8. See also 
Rukavina v. Sprague, 2007 UT App 331, | 8 (trial court must exclude evidence if 
party fails to make Rule 26 disclosures and, at its discretion, may impose other 
sanctions). 
Like the plaintiff in Posner, Lippman undisputedly designated his experts after 
the expert discovery deadline set forth in the Second Amended Scheduling Order. 
Pursuant to the Second Amended Scheduling Order, Lippman was required to 
disclose any expert witness reports by April 1, 2008. (R. 1101). Lippman did not 
disclose his expert witness reports until March 2,2009 (R. 2322.); eleven months after 
the deadline. For the reasons set forth in the Posner decision, the trial court was 
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required, by operation of Rule 37(f), to exclude Lippman's tardy expert witness 
reports unless the court found that the failure to disclose was harmless or that there 
was good cause for the failure. Finding no good cause for the unreasonable delay, the 
trial court followed Rule 37(f), excluded Lippman's late-designated experts and 
reasonably denied Lippman addition time to make his expert designations. 
B. The Trial Court's Denial of Lippman's Third Motion to Amend 
Scheduling Order Was Not Tantamount to Dismissal. 
Footnote eight of the Posner decision is dispositive of Lippman's claim that the 
denial of his Third Motion to Amend Scheduling Order was tantamount to a dismissal 
and possibly a violation of his due process. Posner made the same argument, to which 
this Court responded: 
Posner mischaracterizes the trial court's actions: the trial court did not 
dismiss Posner's action as a sanction; rather it excluded his expert's 
testimony because disclosure of the witness's identity and report was 
untimely. It was the absence of expert testimony, not a sanction by the 
trial court, that led to the dismissal of Posner's claim. 
Posner v. Equity Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 2009 UT App 347, ^  23, f.8. 
Here, Lippman similarly mischaracterizes the lower's court's actions. 
Lippman's experts were excluded as a result of his failure to timely disclose their 
identities and reports. In the event that Lippman's claims are eventually dismissed by 
the lower court as a result of the absence of expert testimony, it will be that absence 
of expert testimony, and not a sanction by the trial court, that causes the dismissal. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
DENYING LIPPMAN'S THIRD MOTION TO AMEND GIVEN THAT 
THE MOTION WAS UNTIMELY, THE COURT FOUND NO GOOD 
CAUSE TO EXCUSE LIPPMAN'S FAILURE TO TIMELY 
DESIGNATE HIS EXPERTS, AND THE COURT FOUND GRANTING 
LIPPMAN'S MOTION WOULD UNDULY BURDEN AND PREJUDICE 
THE PARTIES AND THE COURT, 
The trial court's denial of Lippman's Third Motion to Amend must be 
reviewed in context with the entire history of the case. By June of 2009, this case had 
been pending for more than three years. The trial court aptly noted in its Order that 
the case was filed in 2006, that the original scheduling order had been previously 
extended (on multiple occasions) and that Lippman had already sought many 
amendments to his pleadings. (R. 2442). Notwithstanding the trial court's patience 
in granting Lippman several discovery extensions and opportunities to amend and 
refine his pleadings, Lippman nonetheless failed to timely designate his experts. 
Lippman then inexplicably waited almost an entire year after the expert deadline 
expired to even submit his motion to the trial court. The trial court articulated ample 
bases for finding that Lippman had failed to demonstrate that good cause existed to 
justify his outrageous delay. Furthermore, the trial court found that granting 
Lippman's motion would result in prejudice and further delay. All of these factors 
evidence that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying Lippman's 
Third Motion to Amend Scheduling Order. 
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A. Lippman's Third Motion to Amend Scheduling Order Was Not 
Timely as It Was Submitted Nearly One Year After the Expiration 
of the Expert Witness Disclosure Deadline. 
Lippman would like this Court to believe that he filed his Third Motion to 
Amend Scheduling Order prior to the expiration of the expert witness disclosure 
cutoff date. (App. Br., p. 22). This is simply not true. As set forth in the Second 
Amended Scheduling Order, the expert witness disclosure cutoff date was April 1, 
2008. (R. 1101). Lippman did not file his First Motion to Amend Scheduling Order 
until April 3, 2008, two days after the deadline. (R. 1892). While Lippman's Third 
Motion was ridiculously untimely, not even his First Motion was filed on time as it 
undisputedly came after the expert discovery deadline. 
Lippman's First Motion to Amend Scheduling Order requested a sixty (60) day 
extension of the expert discovery deadline, or until May 31, 2008. (R. 1898). 
Lippman essentially abandoned his First Motion to Amend Scheduling Order and left 
it to languish for nearly a year. During that year, the First Motion to Amend 
Scheduling Order grew stale. The passage of time effectively mooted the Motion as 
the extension Lippman sought in the First Motion to Amend expired with no word 
from Lippman or his counsel. Nine months after the expiration of the sought-after 
extension, Lippman surprisingly resurfaced and submitted his now stale and mooted 
motion for decision. (R. 1892). With his surprise Request to Submit, Lippman also 
attempted to sneak the First Motion to Amend Scheduling Order past the trial court 
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with a modified deadline and an untimely expert designation and report. (R. 2292). 
The trial court saw through the ruse and understandably, would have none of it. 
(R.2369). The trial court denied the First Motion on the basis that it was 
impermissibly stale. 
In an attempt to rehabilitate his credibility in front of the trial court, Lippman 
then filed a Second Motion to Amend Scheduling Order which he subsequently 
withdrew. (R. 2348 and 2374). With his Third Motion to Amend Scheduling Order, 
Lippman attempted to take yet another bite at the same rotten apple. (R. 2377). 
Lippman continues to misrepresent his handling of the case. In his Brief, 
Lippman indicates that 'When faced with unforseen expert witness problems, 
Lippman did appropriately motion the trial court to avoid sanctions." (App. Br., p. 
18). As discussed above, Lippman most certainly never appropriately motioned the 
trial court. 
B. The Record Contains No Actual Evidence Confirming that 
Lippman's Alleged Expert Witnesses Cancelled at the Last Minute. 
Lippman tries to take the role of victim in attempting to excuse his late 
disclosure. Lippman states as fact that his retained experts canceled shortly before the 
expert disclosure deadline (App. Br., pp. 4, 8-9,22); however, the record contains no 
evidence beyond Lippman's bare allegations to support the contentions. Lippman 
indicates that he "unexpectedly had one of his expert witness's decide not to 
participate in the case right before the disclosure deadline and another witness run 
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into family medical issues delaying the report until after the disclosure deadline." 
(App. Br., p. 22). However, the record contains no letter, affidavit or other competent 
evidence of any kind to support these bare assertions. 
Throughout this entire case, including the briefing of these three separate 
motions to amend the scheduling orders, neither Lippman nor his counsel have ever 
provided any documentation supporting his allegations of last-minute difficulties with 
retained experts. Likewise, counsel has never filed an affidavit attesting to these 
purported difficulties. Certainly something as important and necessary as expert 
testimony should be adequately supported and on the record. Yet, none of the 
allegations regarding Lippman's expert witness testimony and any supposed 
withdrawal or delay are supported by a shred of credible, competent evidence. 
Indeed, there is not a single letter, invoice, e-mail, affidavit or anything else to lend 
some modicum of credibility to Lippman's bare allegations. 
Likewise, we have only Lippman's allegations and no affidavit to support 
Lippman's contentions regarding his efforts to locate a replacement expert witness 
after the expert witness disclosure deadline. (App. Br., p. 8-9). If Lippman was 
putting forth such effort to locate and retain new expert witnesses, it does not stand 
to reason that he would have completely failed to timely notify or advise the trial court 
or Coldwell Banker's counsel of both his unfortunate circumstance and his efforts to 
secure a replacement expert. Regardless of the veracity of Lippman's tales of woe in 
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locating and retaining an expert, Lippman's tardy expert disclosures should have 
nevertheless been rejected by the trial court. Even were the tall tales true, Lippman 
waited an unreasonable period of time (nearly a year after the passing of the expert 
discovery deadline) and then submitted his motion under false pretenses (by 
misrepresenting the new expert discovery deadline originally requested). 
C. The Trial Court Found No Good Cause which Justified Lippman's 
Delay; Conversely, the Trial Court Found that Lippman's Failure 
to Timely Disclose His Expert Witness Reports Was Harmful and 
Prejudicial. 
Confirming that the language of Rule 37(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure requires a trial court to exclude expert witnesses disclosed after the 
established deadline, the Court of Appeals notes that trial courts "have discretion to 
determine whether good cause excuses the tardiness or whether prejudice would result 
from allowing the disputed evidence at trial." Posner v. Equity Title Ins. Agency, 
Inc., 2009 UT App 347, f 23. In its Order denying Lippman's Third Motion to 
Amend Scheduling Order, the trial court noted that both the trial court and Coldwell 
Banker would suffer prejudice if the late expert designations were allowed. 
The Scheduling Order and the multiple subsequent amendments to such 
allowed Lippman more than ample time to both designate his expert witnesses and file 
their reports. Coldwell Banker timely complied with the Second Amended 
Scheduling Order and disclosed both of its experts in April of 2008. Lippman 
proposed and agreed to the expert witness deadlines contained in each of the 
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scheduling orders, yet he failed to comply. (R. 0450,0614 and 1099). Later, Lippman 
failed to timely move the trial court to extend the expert discovery deadline. When 
Lippman finally moved the Court to extend the expert discovery deadline (R. 1892), 
he failed to follow through and timely submit the motion. 
Col dwell Banker reasonably believed that Lippman had abandoned his First 
Motion to Amend Scheduling Order as nearly a year passed without the submission 
of the Motion or the filing of any expert witness reports. Then, almost one year after 
filing the First Motion to Amend Scheduling Order, Lippman attempted to submit the 
then-stale Motion. (R. 2295). Lippman underhandedly presented the trial court with 
a proposed Order that included dates almost one year past the dates actually requested 
in the Motion. (R. 2292). Coldwell Banker objected to the proposed Order and the 
trial court swiftly denied the First Motion to Amend Scheduling Order. (R.2369). 
Lippman filed and then promptly withdrew a Second Motion to Amend Scheduling 
Order. (R. 2374). Lippman then filed, nearly one year after the expiration of the 
expert witness deadline, a Third Motion to Amend Scheduling Order. The trial court 
reviewed the motion, held a telephonic scheduling conference with all counsel present 
to discuss the case and all pending motions and then subsequently acted reasonably 
in exercising its equitable discretion when it denied the Motion. 
Certainly, Coldwell Banker would suffer prejudice if Lippman were allowed 
to identify and use its inappropriately designated expert witnesses at such a late date. 
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Coldwell Banker complied with the Second Amended Scheduling Order. Coldwell 
Banker has already incurred much time and expense defending this three-year-old 
litigation. Coldwell Banker reasonably formulated its defense based upon the facts, 
witnesses and information timely disclosed. Coldwell Banker relied upon Lippman 
to comply with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and to timely provide all material 
information during fact and expert discovery. Instead, Lippman attempted to ambush 
both Coldwell Banker and the trial court with his belated and surprise expert witness 
designations filed together with a bogus proposed Order. (R. 2322 and 2292). 
As far as Coldwell Banker and the trial court understood, Lippman took 
absolutely no action in the case as to any expert witnesses for nearly one year after the 
expert disclosure deadline. Lippman, not Coldwell Banker, should bear the con-
sequences for his failure to dutifully pursue his claims, including the consequences 
for his failure to timely designate his expert witnesses. It would be unjust to allow 
Lippman's much belated expert designations or witness reports. 
D. Lippman's Lack of Leniency Towards the Deem Defendants was 
Just One of the Many Factors Cited in the Trial Court's Order. 
Lippman dedicates a large portion of his Brief addressing the Deem 
Defendants and his previous Motion for Summary Judgment against them. (App Br., 
pp. 13-19). Lippman contends that the trial court's denial of his Third Motion to 
Amend Scheduling Order is "based upon" the trial court's earlier ruling on Lippman's 
Motion for Summary Judgment against the Deem Defendants. (App. Br., p. 16). 
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It is clear from a reading of the subject Order that the trial court did not base 
its denial of Lippman's Third Motion to Amend Scheduling Order on the success of 
Lippman's earlier Motion for Summary Judgment against the Deem Defendants. (R. 
2441). While the trial court's Order did indeed refer to Lippman's earlier summary 
judgment against the Deem Defendants, the reference was offered only to confirm the 
consistency with which the trial court enforced its scheduling orders and the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure against all parties in this case. For this reason, the trial court 
noted in its Order that Lippman had "been very dogmatic in requiring other parties to 
adhere to deadlines[]" (R. 2441). 
In addition to pointing out its consistency in enforcing the rules and scheduling 
orders, the trial court also detailed the numerous other reasons for which it denied 
Lippman's Third Motion to Amend Scheduling Order. (R. 2441). The trial court 
noted obviously that the Motion was not timely as it was filed nearly one year after 
the expert deadline; that Lippman had already been granted previous extensions; that 
the Third Motion to Amend Scheduling Order did not request a particular date for the 
extension of time2; that the granting of another extension would cause prejudice, 
including additional expense and delay; and that the case was filed in 2006. (R. 2441). 
2 
Rule 7(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in part that "[a] motion 
shall. . . state succinctly and with particularity the relief sought." URCP 7(b)(1) 
(2009). In his Third Motion to Amend Scheduling Order, Lippman did not request a 
specific date for the extension of the expert witness discovery. (R. 2377). 
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In exercising its equitable discretion, the trial court may well have considered 
Lippman's Draconian and dogmatic lack of leniency juxtaposed with his untimely 
request for additional time. However, the trial court's Order makes clear that it 
considered this as only one of several factors when it denied Lippman's Third Motion 
to Amend Scheduling Order. Lippman's contention that his Third Motion was denied 
based solely on the fact that Lippman previously prevailed against the Deem 
Defendants on summary judgment ignores the evidence, the record and the Court's 
own reasoning set forth in its Order. (R. 2441). 
III. LIPPMAN FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF LIPPMAN'S THIRD MOTION TO 
AMEND SCHEDULING ORDER. 
It is unclear whether Lippman is challenging a factual finding by the trial court. 
Lippman indicates that "the trial court ignored may [sic] important facts that had 
direct relation to making a decision and got some of the facts wrong." (App. Br., p. 
16). However, Lippman does not identify the particular facts. Regardless, the trial 
court found that Lippman's Third Motion to Amend Scheduling Order was without 
merit and would result in prejudice. 
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure indicates in part that 
"A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that 
supports the challenged finding." Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9) (2009). See also Fisher 
v. Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172,1178 (Utah App. 1995); Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438,444 
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(Utah App„ 1998). Lippman failed to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's 
findings which support the denial. When the challenging party fails to comply with 
the marshaling of the evidence , the reviewing court will generally presume that the 
record supports the trial court's factual findings. State v. Chavez-Espinoza, 186 P.3d 
1012 (Utah 2008). See also Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus. 164 P.3d 384 (Utah 
2007). The Court of Appeals has made clear that the burden is on the appellant to 
marshal all of the evidence, in comprehensive and fastidious order, which tends to 
support the trial court findings. State v. Martinez, 47 P.3d 115 (Utah App. 2002); 
Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander & Smith Associates, 881 P.2d 929 
(Utah App. 2002). Lippman failed to meet his burden and has therefore provided this 
Court with another reason to affirm the trial court. Id. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly excluded Lippman's late-designated expert disclosures 
and property denied Lippman's Third Motion to Amend Scheduling Order. Lippman 
unequivocally failed to comply with the Second Amended Scheduling Order and did 
not motion for additional time until well after the established deadline had expired. 
Lippman then impermissibly waited an additional year before requesting a decision 
on his then stale and mooted motion. Dealing with the parties first hand, the trial 
court reasonably exercised its equitable discretion when it denied Lippman's Third 
Motion to Amend Scheduling Order. 
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Accordingly, Coldwell Banker respectfully requests this Court to affirm the 
trial court's order denying Lippman's Third Motion to Amend Scheduling Order. 
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